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Abstract: Although the European General Data Protection Regulation affords data subjects more control over how their
personal data is stored and processed, there is a need for technical solutions to support these legal rights.
In this position paper we assess the level of control, transparency and compliance offered by three different
approaches (i.e., defacto standard, SPECIAL, Solid). We propose a layered decentralised architecture based on
combining SPECIAL and Solid. Finally, we introduce our usage control framework, which we use to compare
and contrast the level of control and compliance offered by the four different approaches.
1 INTRODUCTION
The European General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) is a game changer in terms of personal data
management. In particular, the legislation affords
data subjects control and transparency with respect
to the processing of their personal data by data con-
trollers/processors (i.e., product/service providers).
When it comes to GDPR compliance there are
a variety of questionnaire based tools that enable
data controllers/processors to assess the compliance
of their products/services (cf., (Information Commis-
sioner’s Office (ICO) UK, 2017; Microsoft Trust Cen-
ter, 2017; Nymity, 2017; Agarwal et al., 2018)). At
the same time, researchers are looking into using tech-
nical solutions in order to: (i) enable data subjects to
specify consent at a fine level of granularity; and (ii)
make it possible to automatically check compliance of
existing products and services with respect to the data
subjects consent (cf., Bonatti and Kirrane (2019)).
In this position paper, we explore how technology
can be used to provide stronger guarantees to data
subjects with respect to the processing of their per-
sonal data. We start by defining a motivating scenario,
which is subsequently used to examine the consent,
transparency and compliance guarantees offered by
three alternative approaches, namely: (i) the defacto
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standard where data subjects consent to very general
processing by product/service providers; (ii) SPE-
CIAL1 which empowers data subjects by offering
them flexible consent mechanisms and greater per-
sonal data processing transparency and compliance;
and (iii) Solid2 which decouples data from applica-
tions thus enabling data subjects to decide where their
personal data resides and who gets access to this data.
Summarising our contributions, we: (i) provide a
summary of existing policy languages, transparency
and compliance techniques; (ii) assess the level of
control, transparency and compliance offered by three
different approaches in the context of our motivating
scenario; and (iii) propose a control and compliance
framework that can be used to assess different data
processing and sharing architectures.
The remainder of the paper is structured as fol-
lows: Section 2 describes our motivating scenario and
the corresponding high level requirements. Section 3
presents the necessary background. Section 4 exam-
ines three alternative personal data management ap-
proaches. Section 5 demonstrates how SPECIAL can
be implemented in Solid. Section 6 proposes a frame-
work for evaluating different personal data processing
architectures. Finally, conclusions and directions for
future work are outlined in Section 7.
1https://www.specialprivacy.eu/
2https://solid.mit.edu/
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2 MOTIVATION
We start by describing a concrete motivating scenario
and the requirements used to guide our research.
Use Case Scenario. A fictitious company called
BeFit (i.e. the data controller) is a producer of
wearable appliances for fitness tracking. The device
records parameters such as steps taken, active/inactive
minutes, location, etc. In addition, the device can be
used to monitor food and drinks consumed. The de-
vice owner (i.e. the data subject) uses the device in
order to track activity, record workouts, and manage
weight gain/loss. When it comes to data processing
and collection, there are three specific purposes that
we focus on in this paper:
(i) Service Provision: all of the data gathered by the
Befit device is backed up on a server and is used to
provide activity information to the device owner via
the Befit fitness dashboard;
(ii) Personal Data Sharing: the device owner chooses
to share data collected by the device with friends, fol-
lowers or the general public via a third party social
fitness network; and
(iii) Secondary Use: the device owner consents to
their data being used by BeFit in order to optimise
existing and future products and services.
Requirements. In order to enable scenarios such
as those described above, within the context of the
GDPR, the following three key requirements need to
be facilitated:
Consent: BeFit needs to be able to specify what data
is desired for which purposes. While at the same time
the device owner needs to be able to specify which
data should be used for which purposes.
Transparency: The device owner should be able to
determine what data is collected, what processing is
performed, for what purpose, where the data is stored,
and with whom it is shared.
Compliance: When it comes to personal data process-
ing a company needs to show that they are compliant
with the device owners consent.
3 BACKGROUND
From a usage control perspective there are three broad
bodies of research that need to be considered: (i) ma-
chine interpretable policy specification; (ii) personal
data processing transparency; and (iii) compliance
verification.
Consent. The traditional way to obtain consent is to
ask for consent for all current and future personal data
processing outlined in very general terms by clicking
on an agree button. Acquisti et al. (2013) highlight
that several behavioral studies dispute the effective-
ness of such consent mechanisms from a comprehen-
sion perspective. A study by McDonald and Cranor
(2008) indicates it would take on average 201 hours
per year per individual if people were to actually read
existing privacy policies.
In order to be able to support automated compli-
ance checking it is necessary to encode consent in a
manner that is interpretable by machines. Here policy
languages play a crucial role. Over the years, several
general policy languages that leverage semantic tech-
nologies (such as Rei (Kagal et al., 2003) and Pro-
tune (Bonatti and Olmedilla, 2007)) have been pro-
posed. Such languages cater for a diverse range of
functional requirements, such as access control, query
answering, service discovery, and negotiation, etc.
More recently the SPECIAL project has proposed a
Description Logic based policy language that can be
used to express consent, business policies, and regu-
latory obligations (Bonatti and Kirrane, 2019).
Sticky policies enable data providers to define po-
lices (i.e., preferences and conditions) that state how
their data can be used. For instance, a sticky pol-
icy can be used to govern data usage, for instance
the purposes of the data use, whitelists and blacklists,
obligations for data consumers, notification require-
ments, deletion periods, and trust authorities (Beiter
et al., 2014). Given that data is initially sent in an en-
crypted form, encryption techniques play an impor-
tant role in the sticky policies paradigm. Two differ-
ent works (Tang, 2008; Beiter et al., 2014) summarise
various encryption techniques used in sticky policy
enforcement mechanisms.
Transparency. From a transparency perspective,
Bonatti et al. (2017) identified a set of criteria that
are important for enabling transparent processing of
personal data at scale, and summarise existing litera-
ture with respect to the proposed criteria. Several of
these works use a secret key signing scheme based on
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) together with
a hashing algorithm to generate chains of log records
that can be used to ensure log confidentiality and in-
tegrity (cf., Bellare and Yee (1997)). When it comes
to personal data processing, Sackmann et al. (2006)
demonstrate how a secure logging system can be used
for privacy-aware event encoding. In particular, they
introduce the ”privacy evidence” concept and discuss
how logs can be used to ensure that privacy policies
are adhered to. While, Pulls et al. (2013) propose
a protocol, which is based on MAC secure logging
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techniques, that can be used to ensure both confiden-
tiality and unlinkability of events.
Compliance. From a GDPR compliance perspective,
recently the British Information Commissioner’s Of-
fice (ICO) (Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)
UK, 2017), Microsoft (Microsoft Trust Center, 2017),
and Nymity (Nymity, 2017) have developed compli-
ance tools that enable companies to assess the com-
pliance of their applications and business processes
by completing a predefined questionnaire. When it
comes to automatic compliance checking there is a
large body of work that focuses on modelling and rea-
soning over legal requirements using semantic tech-
nologies (cf., (Boer et al., 2008; Bartolini et al., 2015;
Pandit et al., 2018)). For instance, (Palmirani et al.,
2011; Athan et al., 2013) demonstrated how Legal-
RuleML can be used to specify legal norms. More re-
cently Bartolini et al. (2015) and Pandit et al. (2018)
propose ontologies that can be used to model data pro-
tection requirements in a manner that supports com-
pliance verification. While, De Vos et al. (2019)
demonstrate how business policies and legal require-
ments can be represented using a flavor of ODRL,
and checked automatically via the Institutional Action
Language language.
4 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Next we discuss different approaches to personal data
management guided by our motivating scenario.
The Defacto Standard Approach. In the vast ma-
jority of cases when a user signs up for a new prod-
uct/service the company presents them with a docu-
ment where all possible current and future personal
data processing is described in very general terms,
and a checkbox that needs to be ticked in order to use
the product/service.
Consent: The GDPR defines several potential legal
bases (consent, contract, legal obligation, vital in-
terest, public interest, exercise of official authority,
and legitimate interest) under which companies can
legally process personal data. In terms of consent
companies should ask for consent if the data required
goes beyond what is needed for other legal bases.
Transparency: The GDPR empowers data subjects
with the right to obtain a copy of all personal data that
a data controller/processor has concerning them. Fol-
lowing best practice companies should be transparent
with respect to the information that will be collected
for which purposes.
Compliance: The GDPR provides a legal framework
for data subjects to lodge complaints with a supervi-
sory authority if their rights have been infringed.
Considering common practices when it comes to han-
dling personal data, in the standard case our BeFit use
case scenario could be implemented as follows:
(i) Service Provision: BeFit should provide trans-
parency with respect to the processing performed by
the device by offering the device owner the ability to
opt into all data processing that is necessary in order
for the fitness device to function.
(ii) Personal Data Sharing: In order to benefit from
existing cloud based analytic services the device
owner would also need to opt into the 3rd party an-
alytic service providers privacy policy and their terms
and services. If integration with the desired third-
party service is not possible the device owner can re-
sort to data subject access requests to download their
data such that it can be uploaded to the analytic ser-
vice providers website.
(iii) Secondary Use: Article 5 of the GDPR states
that personal data that is collected for specified, ex-
plicit and legitimate purposes should not be further
processed in a manner that is incompatible with said
purposes, unless there is a legal basis for doing so. For
this reason it has become common practice for com-
panies to ask for consent for secondary use separately.
The SPECIAL Approach. The SPECIAL plat-
form, which is routed in Semantic Web technologies
and Linked Data principles: (i) supports the acquisi-
tion of data subject consent and the recording of both
data and metadata (consent, legislative obligations,
business processes) as policies; (ii) caters for auto-
mated transparency and compliance verification; and
(iv) provides a dashboard that make personal data pro-
cessing comprehensible for data subjects, controllers,
and processors.
Consent: The SPECIAL project has developed and
evaluated several alternative consent user interfaces
that enable data controllers to ask for consent for par-
ticular data points to be processed for explicitly stated
purposes. The consent is subsequently translated into
machine understandable policies (i.e., what data is
collected, for which purposes, what processing is per-
formed, where they data are stored for how long and
with whom it is shared) that are encoded using the
SPECIAL Policy Language3.
Transparency: The SPECIAL log vocabulary4 en-
ables companies to record all data processing/sharing
3http://purl.org/specialprivacy/policylanguage
4http://purl.org/specialprivacy/splog
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performed within their company. The log vocabulary
builds upon the SPECIAL policy language ontology
and reuses well known vocabularies such as PROV5
for recording provenance metadata. While, the SPE-
CIAL dashboard provides a uniform interface to let
data subjects exercise their rights (i.e., access to data,
right to erasure, etc.).
Compliance: The SPECIAL project supports three
different types of compliance checking: (i) the data
processing which a company would like to perform
complies with the data subjects consent (i.e., ex-ante
compliance checking); (ii) all personal data process-
ing performed by the companies products and ser-
vices are stored in an event log (i.e., the SPECIAL
ledger) which is subsequently checked against the
data subjects consent (i.e., ex-post compliance check-
ing); and (iii) business processes are recorded as sets
of permissions and checked against regulatory obli-
gations set forth in the GDPR (i.e., business process
compliance testing).
Our BeFit use case scenario could be implemented in
SPECIAL as follows:
(i) Service Provision: The SPECIAL consent inter-
face could be used to obtain fine grained consent
for specific processing, for instance to derive calo-
ries burned, display route on map, back up data, etc.
While the SPECIAL dashboard could be used to pro-
vide transparency with respect to the data processing
performed on the device.
(ii) Personal Data Sharing: At the request of the de-
vice owner BeFit could share data with existing cloud
based analytic services (e.g., Runkeeping and Strava).
A sticky policy could in turn be used to tightly couple
usage constraints and the personal data that it governs.
(iii) Secondary Use: At the request of the device
owner BeFit could use the device owners personal
data for the secondary purpose of improving BeFit’s
products and services. The device owner would have
full transparency with respect to this processing and
could elect to opt out at any point in the future.
The Solid Approach. The term “Social Linked
Data” or Solid (Sambra et al., 2016) refers to a rec-
ommended set of tools, best practices, and predom-
inately W3C standards and protocols, to build de-
centralised social applications based on Linked Data
principles. Its main premise is establishing pod-
centric platforms: data subjects maintain a personal
domain and associated data storage, i.e. a data pod,
from which they give applications permission to read
or write personal data. The pod provides a set of
5https://www.w3.org/TR/prov-o/
personal Web APIs, an identity provider using We-
bID, and an inbox to receive notifications based on
Websockets or Linked Data Notifications (LDN) (Ca-
padisli et al., 2017). Because of its open ecosystem
and progressive stance, Solid is able to attract a sig-
nificant developer community for improving the stan-
dards and tools, and building more applications.
Consent: Solid extensively decouples data from ser-
vices, thus increasing the user’s control over per-
sonal data, enhancing the mobility of data between
services and lowering data duplication overall. The
interoperability through Linked Data standards and
protocols (i.e., the Resource Description Framework
(RDF) data model) ensures any pod can provide data
to any service application. A basic consent mecha-
nism is present in the Solid pod as an access-control
list (ACL), where data providers agree to let an ap-
plication read or write certain resources that reside in
their pod.
Transparency: Solid is able to achieve full trans-
parency on primary data access: the data pod owner
has a complete view on who is reading or writing what
data and when, and whether they have the permissions
to do so. These activities can be recorded by applying
any log vocabulary; Solid currently does not provide
a default one. Like in other approaches, transparency
on secondary data access or data processing, i.e. data
that does not directly originate from the data pod be-
cause it was copied, cached or inferred, requires ad-
ditional measures. However, Solid does provides a
notification system that enhances the implementation
of transparency, for instance by alerting data subjects
about how their data is used.
Compliance: Solid offers the standards necessary to
connect to data pods, retrieve their data and use them.
Ex-ante compliance checking is performed by en-
forcing the ACL rules: data access that is directly
non-compliant will be blocked. Ex-post compliance
checking can be performed by inspecting the pod’s
ACL log for patterns of misconduct.
Our BeFit use case scenario could be implemented in
Solid as follows:
(i) Service Provision: The device owner owns a Solid
pod, in which all data captured by the device is stored.
In order to use BeFit’s fitness dashboard application,
the device owner registers with their pod. Upon reg-
istration, BeFit requests access to the personal data
captured by the device and advises on the intended
use. In the pod’s management dashboard, the device
owner can decide to grant or deny access, and specify
the applied policy.
(ii) Personal Data Sharing: With the device’s data re-
siding in the device owner’s pod, they can be shared
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Figure 1: Technical extensions.
with any existing service without the approval or in-
terference of BeFit. The sharing process would be
identical to the process for BeFit’s fitness dashboard.
(iii) Secondary Use: BeFit can request additional data
or intended use such as optimising existing and future
products, when the device owner registers the pod or
by sending a notification to the pod’s inbox. In the
pod’s management dashboard, the device owner could
opt-in or opt-out to these changes. When it comes
to additional data access, full transparency is covered
through the ACL log.
5 STRONGER GUARANTEES
In this section, we discuss how the consent, trans-
parency and compliance methods from the SPECIAL
project could be implemented in a Solid environment,
resulting in great control and transparency. From a
compliance perspective, we touch upon mechanisms
that could establish trust between data providers and
service providers in such a scenario.
Applying SPECIAL in Solid. In Section 4, we dis-
cussed three scenarios for personal data sharing and
processing, each with a specific technical architec-
ture and distinctive consent, transparency and com-
pliance mechanisms. However, the layering of these
approaches, as depicted in Figure 1, could in fact pro-
vide data subjects with stronger guarantees on per-
sonal data processing. The defacto standard approach
sets the baseline where the data subject has legal guar-
antees originating from the GPDR: opt-in consent, the
right to access, and a complaints mechanism. The
SPECIAL project extends this scenario with machine
understandable policies and logging, methods for au-
tomated compliance checking, a dashboard for trans-
parency, and more control from a consent perspective.
With Solid, the mechanisms above can be embed-
ded as follows: personal data now resides in a Solid
data pod as part of a decentralized Web-based ecosys-
tem under the full control of the data subject. This de-
coupling of applications and data provides data sub-
jects with more leverage to co-determine the data us-
age policy. Service providers are not granted data ac-
cess before the policy is decided upon, and moving
data between services is significantly easier, allowing
unsatisfied data subjects to go elsewhere. In addition
to this paradigm, Solid offers the means to implement
the SPECIAL consent, transparency and compliance
mechanisms in an open, pod-centric, and decentral-
ized Web environment: standard data exchange Web
protocols, a notification system, open-source software
and a growing developer community.
Figure 2 shows a possible implementation of SPE-
CIAL using Solid. The service providers’ applica-
tions and the data subjects’ pods both adopt: (i) the
SPECIAL policy language to increase the granular-
ity of Solid’s ACL-based access control; and (ii) the
SPECIAL log vocabulary to record data usage events.
Data subjects can register their personal data pod with
applications from different service providers. Both
parties use the policy language to decide on the pol-
icy to apply to the data, possibly with help of the
SPECIAL’s consent user interfaces. Consent can be
given after a policy negotiation phase: (i) the service
provider expresses the policy it desires in exchange
for its service; (ii) the data subject responds with what
is acceptable; (iii) after mutual agreement the data
subjects consent is materialized as a sticky policy, and
the application is granted access to the data. A Solid
pod uses the log vocabulary to record all read or write
activity in a local log, and a Solid application uses the
log vocabulary to record all data retrieval, processing,
and sharing activities. Depending on the trust mech-
anism in effect (more info on this later) the former
is stored in the SPECIAL ledger, a local log, a dis-
tributed log, or with another trusted third-party.
Over plain Solid, the integration of SPECIAL of-
fers service providers the means to communicate any
further data processing (policy language and ledger);
and the device owner has the means to monitor and
manage data usage from its Solid pod in a compre-
hensible way (consent user interface and dashboard).
The used policy and logs feed SPECIAL’s automatic
ex-post compliance checking process. A cross-check
of logs from both parties can discover inconsisten-
cies with the policy and thus detect compliance failure
early. The ex-ante checking process can be adopted
when Solid applications also describe their business
logic, which can be displayed in the dashboard as
well as enhance transparency even further. Finally,
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Solid’s notification system allows a continuous inter-
action between data pods and applications, facilitat-
ing later changes such as policy updates, novel types
of data usage, and opting out.
Trust Mechanisms. There are certain types of data
use where strong compliance guarantees can only be
given by means of trust. Therefore, we discuss several
trust mechanisms adopted from (Jøsang et al., 2007)
in the context of an open Web environment, with the
purpose of obtaining the degree of trustworthiness
data subjects assign to a data controller/processor
for adhering to a jointly agreed upon data usage pol-
icy. Most existing works on trusted environments
introduce strong ties to the OS and hardware lay-
ers, which makes them very applicable to central-
ized and distributed computing (Azzedin and Mah-
eswaran, 2002). However, they loose most benefits
and guarantees when this ecosystem is opened up,
such as Solid. Protocols and environments with far-
reaching trust guarantees such as Trusted Comput-
ing (Mitchell, 2005) even directly contradict an open
platform and are criticized for encouraging vendor
lock-in (Oppliger and Rytz, 2005). Within open, dis-
tributed and decentralized multi-agent systems like
the Web and Solid, trust mechanisms are generally
limited to softer guarantees in exchange for inter-
operability (Cofta, 2018). From the works herein,
Pinyol and Sabater-Mir (2013) identify three main ap-
proaches:
Security or policy-based approaches rely on cryptog-
raphy and digital signatures to ensure basic guaran-
tees such as the authenticity and integrity of a specific
party, which presumably leads towards trust. This ap-
proach, which is already adopted by the sticky poli-
cies from SPECIAL, does not increase trust in data
usage. Hence, additional trust mechanisms are re-
quired.
Institutional approaches require a centralised third-
party to reward or punish parties according to their re-
ported activities. According to Golbeck (2006), these
are most valuable in smaller data subject-processor
subnets. For socio-economic and technical difficul-
ties, it seems unlikely that Solid will ever span a Web-
scale network. Instead, it is likely that data pods
will be part of many small Solid subnetworks formed
around a certain (type of) application, driven by the
network effect (Hendler and Golbeck, 2008). For
highly regulated applications with rather static user-
bases such as banking, it is legitimate for data pods to
trust a single auditing institution.
Social Social approaches establish trust based on
past interactions qualified by the data subject or its
peers (Bonatti et al., 2005), often coined as refer-
ral trust (Artz and Gil, 2007). One example in-
volves building certificate chains to form a “Web of
trust” (Backes et al., 2010). A member expresses
belief in another member by singing his public key.
This belief is transitive, therefore a member can trust
public keys by verifying the existence of a chain.
(Backes et al., 2010) show that this can also be done in
anonymity by using non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge. Reputation-based approaches
add weightings to referral trust to establish a softer,
less binary decision. Wahab et al. (2015) identi-
fies four common models: Feedback-based models
calculate a trust value based on user reviews based
on quality of service metrics. Major challenges are
how to bootstrap trust in a new or modified net-
work and to ensure the quality and credibility of
reviews. Statistics-based models combine multiple
sources of trust with objective statistical methods
(e.g., a Bayesian network or PageRank); fuzzy-logic
based models combine subjective feedback and ob-
jective quality measurements to indicate trust without
computing a final trust value; and data-mining-based
models use text mining to analyze reviews assuming
user reviews are always credible. Because Solid re-
distributes leverage (i.e., the policy and data are not
under control of the service provider by default), so-
cial trust approaches are significantly more powerful.
Especially where a bad reputation can lead to data
providers moving their Solid pod to a competing ser-
vice.
ICISSP 2020 - 6th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy
660
Se
ma
nti
cs
Us
er
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e
Da
ta 
mo
bili
ty
Au
tom
ate
d
co
mp
lian
ce
Lo
gg
ing
Gr
an
ula
rity
High
Low
We
b
sta
nd
ard
s
De
ve
lop
er
co
mm
un
ity
Dig
ita
l
sig
na
tur
e
SPECIAL+SOLID...
... Defacto
approach SPECIAL SOLID
TR
A
N
SP
A
R
EN
C
Y
C
O
N
SE
N
T
C
O
M
PL
IA
N
C
E
A
do
pt
io
n
Figure 3: Usage Control Framework.
6 ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
Finally we propose a usage control framework that
can be used to assess different data processing and
sharing architectures. The framework consists of nine
features whose adoption in architectures would pro-
vide stronger guarantees in terms of consent, trans-
parency, and compliance. Aside from the web stan-
dards and developer community features (both of
which are necessary for pushing this research agenda
forward) all other features were derived from the lit-
erature presented in Section 3.
Semantics enables the machines to understand the
data, which eases automation, data integration and
interoperability across applications. Moreover, con-
cepts, relationships between things and categories of
things can be defined in semantic data models. En-
abling such models for policies and logs would help
machines not only to enforce the policies automati-
cally but also to record the data access and usage re-
lated log entries in a machine-processable way.
Granularity refers to the levels of detail carried for
describing policies and log records.
Logging is the act of recording events related to the
execution of business logic and to access and usage
of personal data.
Automated Compliance is the ability to automatically
adhere to policies that are defined by data subjects and
legal regulations while accessing or processing per-
sonal data.
Digital Signatures are mathematical schemes for ver-
ifying the authenticity of the source of data and for
ensuring the integrity of data. These signatures sup-
port sticky policies and the integrity of the log.
User Experience (UX) deals with human cognitive
limitations by improving human-computer interaction
and system aspects such as utility, ease of use and ef-
ficiency for consent and transparency management.
Data Mobility is immediate and self-service access to
personal data with regard to right of access defined in
GDPR.
Web Standards are the formal, open standards and
other technical specifications that define and de-
scribe aspects of the World Wide Web. The use of
such standards would potentially standardize com-
pliance checking mechanisms and facilitate trans-
parency across corporate boundaries.
Developer Community is a group of programmers that
are supported by APIs and proper documentation so
that they can contribute to development efforts. The
more the web standards are followed in an architec-
ture the easier it would get for the developers to take
develop applications.
In Figure 3, the y-axis denotes the degree of
adoption of the described features by four different
data processing architectures portrayed in Sections 4
and 5. The lower end of the figure categorizes the
features with respect to their relation to the key re-
quirements derived for usage control in Section 2.
7 CONCLUSIONS
SPECIAL affords data subjects more control over
how their data is used, however given the data re-
sides on the company servers SPECIAL assumes that
they are working with companies who want to demon-
strate compliance. Solid potentially provides for the
greatest degree of control in terms of policy speci-
fication, however the enforcement of usage control
in a decentralised setting is still an open research
challenge. Thus, a combination of both complimen-
tary approaches and a suitable mechanism to establish
trust between parties, could provide a solid base for
building environment with strong data usage control
and compliance. In future work we plan to demon-
strate how the Open Digital Rights Language can be
used to specify Solid usage policies and to support ne-
gotiation between data producers and consumers and
enhancing the Linked Data platform protocols with
policy exchange and negotiation mechanisms.
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